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2001. I would like to thank the round-table participants for their valuable comments and suggestions.
I would also like to thank the editors of the Review, particularly Tim Dunne, for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article.
2 Benno Teschke, ‘Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory’,
International Organization, 52:2 (1998), p. 328.
3 For a good summary of such criticisms, see Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in
World History—Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000). See also Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Idea of History and History with Ideas: Toward a
Constructivist Historical Sociology of International Relations’, in John M. Hobson and Steve
Hobden (eds.), Bringing Historical Sociologies into International Relations (forthcoming).
4 See Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1998).
5 See in particular, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the
Theory of International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), Martin Wight, Systems of States,
edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), Hedley Bull
and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984),
Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London:
Routledge, 1992), and Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
System, empire and state in Chinese
international relations 
YO N G J I N  Z H A N G 1
Two criticisms have long been directed at the theorization of international relations
(IR): ahistoricism and Eurocentrism. Westphalia, it is argued, has been so
stigmatized that it has become synonymous with the beginning as well as the end of
what we understand as international relations. Rationalist theorizing in general, of
both the neorealist and neoliberal persuasions, has produced a set of deductive
theories that aim and claim to transcend history. Neorealism of the Waltzian brand
in particular is ‘cleansed’ of history.2 Such concepts as state, system and sovereignty,
so central to the theorizing enterprise, have rarely been historicized in their proper
context.3 Although such indictment is not new and the problematic of the discipline
has been long recognized, challenges have not been adequately taken up even when
the end of the Cold War shattered the disciplinary complacency and exposed its
inability to explain and understand, let alone to predict, the fundamental transform-
ation in contemporary international relations. The remedies are, nevertheless, slow in
coming. The English School, it is true, has managed to eschew ahistoricism through
their concerted efforts to ‘invent international society’.4 Historical narratives of the
evolution and expansion of international society by members of the English School,
from Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull and Martin Wight to Adam Watson and
Robert Jackson, constitute an indispensable part of their theorizing.5 It is also true
that the recent intervention of historical sociology and the constructive turn in
theorizing about IR have led us into deeper and broader sweeps of world history in
the search for historicized conceptions of state and for the institutional rationality of
international relations. Ironically, such greater historical sensitivity may have
reinforced rather than mediated existing Eurocentrism. Ancient Greece—the Hellas,
the Roman Empire, and medieval European history have been either rediscovered or
reaffirmed as the most favoured, if not the only, pre-Westphalian ‘testing ground’ for
existing IR theories. The nature of political orders beyond European history and
their historical transformations still remain largely outside the empirical purview of
much recent theorizing of IR.6
It is therefore not surprising that though fleeting and flirting references to frag-
ments of the history of Chinese international relations, particularly the Warring
States period, have often been made in theoretical works of IR, Ancient and
Imperial China has not been taken very seriously.7 Adda Bozeman’s work published
more than forty years ago still stands as a rare exception in this regard.8 To the
extent that the system of states in Ancient China and the so-called Chinese world
order have been looked at, the subjects remain the privileged preserve of Sinologists
and Chinese historians.9 Yet, the Chinese experience is uniquely challenging, as it
evolved entirely independently of European influence until modern times. Ancient
China produced one of the earliest systems of states in the world, which initially
paralleled and later survived the existence of the Ancient Greek city-states system.
Imperial China, in addition, presided over a long-lasting social order in East Asia,
an international system of a sort nestled in a distinct civilization and with its own
structuring and organizing principles. Until the second half of the nineteenth
century, Chinese international relations were subject to their own distinctive rules,
norms, discourses and institutions. Epic transformations, too, have taken place in
Chinese international relations. How the system of states emerged from the collapse
of the central authority of the Zhou Dynasty in the eighth century BC and why a
universal empire was reduced to a civilizational state in the twentieth century
presents both challenges and implications for a historically informed IR theoriz-
ation. If a truly world historical perspective is imperative in remaking the studies of
international relations, as Barry Buzan and Richard Little have advocated,10 it is
time to bring China in.
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6 See for example John M. Hobson, ‘The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical
Sociology in International Relations’, Review of International Political Economy, 5:2 (1998),
pp. 284–320; Stuart J. Kaufman, ‘The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems’,
International Organization, 51:2 (Spring 1997), pp. 173–208; Steve Hobden, ‘Theorising the
International System: Perspectives from Historical Sociology’, Review of International Studies, 25:2
(1999), pp. 257–71. Teschke, ‘Geopolitical Relations’, pp. 325–58, and Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral
Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Kaufman, though, has tentatively looked at the
history of ancient Middle East as a testing case.
7 Watson’s The Evolution of International Society does contain a brief chapter on the Ancient Chinese
system of states. See pp. 85–93.
8 Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1960). Bozeman devoted a whole chapter in this book (Chapter 4) to studying international
relations in Chinese history. What also makes Bozeman’s book different is that she weaves this into a
truly international history, which she views indivisible as a universally shared fund of human
experience.
9 See for example John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), and Richard Louis Walker, The Multi-
State System of Ancient China (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971).
10 Buzan and Little, 2000.
In this essay, I provide a broad analytical canvas of three historically varying
forms of international order that China has experienced: the onset and endurance of
a multi-state system in Ancient China, the triumph and vicissitudes of a unified and
universalist empire and a world order associated with it, and its eventual encounter-
ing with the European international society and the metamorphosis of the Chinese
empire into a state among states in the Westphalian order. My main purpose in
providing the analytical discussions that follow is threefold. First, it is to look at how
states and political entities are bound together in their interactions not just beyond
the misty horizon of the European experience but also before the rise of European
civilization. How earlier human enterprises (from Sumerian to Persian and from
Ancient Greek to Ancient Chinese) function in organizing and regulating their
mutual relations clearly forms and frames the deep historical context from which the
modern international system emerges. Second, it is to subject what Northedge once
called ‘ancestors of the modern system’11 in Chinese history to an institutional
analysis. Ideas and practices and institutional achievements and failures of the
multi-state system in Ancient China and the enduring Chinese world order, I believe,
still raise questions of broad intellectual concerns that continue to resonate in
contemporary international relations. Finally, an equally important purpose that I
hope this analytical essay will serve is to foster an appreciation from a deeper
historical perspective of the discomfort and unease that China has experienced in its
relations with contemporary international society.
This is an ambitious task and as a consequence my efforts are exploratory and
suggestive. The main body of the first section provides a concise discussion of
institutional features of the system of states in Ancient China to see how some basic
ideas and institutions in the modern European international system are already
working there, albeit conceptualized differently. I also investigate in this section how
and why philosophical discourse during this period frames the raison d’être for the
emerging Pax Sinica. The second section studies puzzles surrounding Pax Sinica—
the Imperial Chinese world order. It explores the tribute system as a system of
thought and institutions regulating Imperial China’s international relations. The
puzzle of the longevity and resilience of Pax Sinica, which prevailed in the Chinese
world for more than two millenniums, opens up my discussions of institutional
rationality of the Chinese world order in this section. In the third section, I offer an
analytical account of how the third great transformation of Chinese international
relations not only ‘squeeze[d] a civilization into the arbitrary, constraining frame-
work of the modern state’12 but also brings China into the emerging global inter-
national society. My reflections are offered in the conclusion.
The system of states in Ancient China: institutional features and intellectual legacies
The emergence of a multi-state system in Ancient China is commonly attributed to
the decline and eventual collapse of the central public authority of the Zhou
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11 F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), pp. 34–52.
12 Lucian Pye, ‘China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society’, Foreign Affairs, 69:4 (Fall 1990), p. 58.
Dynasty. Although the systemic power configurations in the Spring and Autumn
period (770 BC to 476 BC) and the Warring States period (475 BC to 221 BC) varied
radically,13 this system of states sustained ‘international’ relations of Ancient China
for over five centuries, only to be replaced by the establishment of the first universal
Chinese empire by the Qin in 221 BC. Ancient Chinese states, then, faced the
classical dilemma of any decentralized international system, that of anarchy. What
were the innovative extra-territorial institutions and practices that were designed to
mediate anarchy and solve the problem of co-operation and conflict? In other words,
what were the basic institutional features of the Ancient Chinese states-system? I
argue that elements of constitutional principles and some basic institutional
practices that are said to have characterized the modern European international
system were already present and functioning in the system of states in Ancient
China. They were nevertheless conceptualized differently. Further, such institutional
arrangements and practices were underscored and sustained by the existence of a
common culture.
Common culture
A system of states, in Wight’s words, ‘presupposes a common culture’.14 Unlike the
Greek city-states system, which grew out of barbarism, the multi-state system in
Ancient China emerged in the heartland of the Chinese civilization. Moreover, in the
five centuries of its existence, it never expanded beyond the Chinese cultural area.15
Cultural commonality was further underscored by a shared recent past and shared
legends, which bound these states together.16 One could also talk about a common
descent, as the rulers of these nascent states were all from the aristocracies of the
Zhou Dynasty. That reinforced their common identity, and even common morality.
Zhou Li (the rites of the Zhou), for example, informed extensively various
institutions that played the most important role in regulating relations among
Ancient Chinese states.17 Finally, the common language of the Chinese performed
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13 The differences have been captured nicely by a Chinese historian when argued that ‘Whereas wars
during the Spring and Autumn period were waged mainly to contend for hegemonic leadership (Ba),
wars waged during the Warring States period aimed at annexation’. Yang Kuan, Zhan Guo Shi (A
History of the Warring States Period) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1998), p. 2.
14 Wight, Systems of States, p. 46.
15 The Chinese cultural area was, it should be noted, an ever-expanding one. Cultural commonality in
the Ancient Chinese world refers to an existing state of affairs as much as a creative process. The
sinicization of barbarians (yi xia bian yi) was already in dynamic full swing in the Spring and Autumn
period. The states of Chu and Yue, which were regarded as ‘non-Chinese’, were fully assimilated
through participating in the rivalry for Ba (hegemony/leadership) and in the political order. Both
indeed won leadership contests at various times during the Spring and Autumn period. The state of
Qin, which eventually unified China at the end of the Warring States period, was once regarded as
‘semi-barbarian’, as it was situated at the periphery of the Chinese cultural world.
16 All these states, estimated at between 148 and 170 at the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period,
had previously been principalities of the Zhou Dynasty. They emerged as states with independent
claims only when the authorities of the Zhou Court slowly but inexorably dissolved. Many of them
however retained a semblance of allegiance to the Zhou Court until as late as the end of the fifth
century BC.
17 Hong Junpei, Chunqiu Guoji Gongfa (International Law in the Spring and Autumn Period) (Taipei:
Literature, History and Philosophy Publishing House, 1975), pp. 58–62.
dual functions in enhancing the cultural basis of the Ancient Chinese states-system.
The common identity of the states against the non-Chinese speaking ‘barbarians’
was enhanced, and the bilateral and multilateral state-to-state communication and
diplomacy, and mutual understanding among peoples, was facilitated.18 Such a high
degree of commonality in terms of culture, history and language among members of
the Ancient Chinese world went a long way towards accounting for the homogeneity
of members in terms of the structure both of the state and of government that
characterized the Ancient Chinese states-system.19
Extra-territorial institutions and practices
If the assumption of the existence of a states-system accepts the presence of a
common culture, it must be safely assumed that a common culture among members
facilitated the emergence and operation of extra-territorial institutions that operated
to regulate interstate relations and sustain the system per se. Given frequent
occurrences of wars and the intensity of conflicts, it is hard to imagine that such
intensive and comprehensive intercourse—political, military, economic and cultural
—among states in Ancient China was possible without some sort of jus gentium.
What were then important extra-territorial institutions and practices that prevailed
in Ancient China? In other words, what norms were endorsed, exemplified and
codified, and what codes were sanctioned, honoured and observed by members of
the Ancient Chinese states-system in peace as well as in war? Ample evidence
suggests that as a response to challenges encountered in solving problems of co-
operation, conflict, and co-existence, an elaborate culturally informed web of codes
was formulated and followed by member states in their mutual relations within the
Chinese system.20 Among the most important are sovereignty, diplomacy, the
balance of power and rituals (dealt with in turn below).
By the term external sovereignty I mean ‘the exclusive capacity to conclude
international treaties, declare war, and have diplomatic representation’.21 There was
certainly no formal legal expression of external sovereignty as a constitutional
principle in the Ancient Chinese states-system. However, one does not need to dig
deep to locate its firm institutional ground.22 Ancient Chinese states, for example,
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18 It is not uncommon, for example, for diplomats and scholarly advisers to serve several courts in their
lifetime and even at the same time. Confucius was one such ineffective adviser to a number of courts
other than his native one. See Joseph R. Levenson and Franz Schurmann, China: An Interpretive
History from the Beginnings to the Fall of Han (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969),
p. 46.
19 This is of course not to deny the existence of localism as seen in broad differences in dialect, customs,
religion, legends and cults, which existed among the various regions prior to the Spring and Autumn
period.
20 The American sinologist William A. P. Martin is probably the first Western scholar to compare rules
and norms of Ancient Chinese international relations to modern international law. At the
International Conference of Orientalists in Berlin in 1881, Martin presented a paper entitled ‘Traces
of International Law in Ancient China’. A revised version of this paper is included in William A. P.
Martin, The Lore of Cathay (London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1901), pp. 427–49. Martin was
also responsible for translating Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law into Chinese in 1864,
the first of its kind, which was published by the government of the Qing Dynasty.
21 Teschke, ‘Geopolitical Relations’, p. 350.
22 This is also the case with the ancient Greek and Renaissance Italian states-systems. Christian Reus-
Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, p. 6.
monopolized the right to declare war against each other. Thus in a bilateral treaty
between the state of Qin and the state of Chu in 579 BC, it was stipulated that ‘Chu
and Chin [Qin] shall not go to war with each other’.23 Those states also frequently
changed their allies and made treaties among themselves, as discussed below. To the
extent that these states were territorialized, sovereignty informs territoriality, too. It
was not uncommon practice for a state to cede part of its territory either as a
condition for peace, or as an exchange for a favour, or as an expression of gratitude.24
States also controlled the right of passage through their territory by foreign
diplomatic envoys.25 More interestingly, states acknowledged mutually their right to
offer political asylum, particularly to the nobility of other states. Some states also
agreed on the rule related to the extradition of criminals and traitors, which were in
some cases explicitly written into treaties. 26
A wide range of diplomatic practices was conducted among members of the
Ancient Chinese states-system, ranging from frequent diplomatic messengers,
regular court visits and conferences of princes as ‘moments of maximum
communication’.27 It was customary that the rulers themselves attended and signed
bilateral and multilateral treaties committing their states. It is claimed that the head
of the Qi state called for and attended personally twenty-four bilateral and
multilateral ‘summit meetings’ between 681 and 644 BC.28 What is sometimes
claimed to be the world’s first multilateral disarmament conference was held in 546
BC.29 Spies and hostages were well-established institutions in the diplomatic
system, too.30 Although permanent resident diplomatic missions were not main-
tained, frequent diplomatic contact and communication was ensured by the fact
that all important occasions in the life of a ruling prince/king, including his birth,
death, marriage, burial and assumption of throne, all obliged friendly states to send
diplomatic envoys to deliver congratulations or convey condolences.31 After
dispensing with proper ceremonies, these occasions became regular diplomatic
channels to discuss interstate affairs. Diplomacy encompassed so wide a range of
activities that a rich vocabulary had to be developed to record them and to
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23 Walker, Multi-State System of Ancient China, p. 83. It has also been noted that states in Ancient
China agreed that a state should not be invaded in the year in which its ruler has died, or in which
there has been an insurrection within the state. Hong Junpei, International Law, pp. 266–8. A number
of culturally informed rules amounting to the laws of war were also practised. For more details, see
William A. P. Martin, The Lore of Cathay, pp. 443–8.
24 Sun Yurong, Gudai Zhongguo Guojifa Yanjiu (A Study of International Law in Ancient China)
(Beijing: Chinese University of Politics and Law Press, 1999), pp. 80–81.
25 In Walker’s words, ‘It was customary for envoys to obtain permission for passage through the states
which lay in the path of their missions. Envoys who attempted to pass without permission were seized
and some were put to death’. Walker, Multi-State System of Ancient China, p. 24. See also Sun
Yurong, International Law in Ancient China, p. 86.
26 Roswell Britton, ‘Chinese Interstate Intercourse before 700 BC’, American Journal of International
Law, 29 (1935), pp. 630–2. See also Walker, Multi-State System of Ancient China, p. 90.
27 Wight, Systems of States, p. 32.
28 Walker, Multi-State System of Ancient China, p. 79.
29 Ibid, pp. 56–8. See also Hsu Chao-yun, ‘The Spring and Autumn Period’, in Michael Loewe and
Edward L. Shaughnessy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of
Civilization to 221 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 562.
30 It was not an uncommon practice, for example, for the two states that were party to a bilateral treaty
to exchange hostages as a guarantee for the enforcement of the treaty signed. On such occasions,
hostages were often sons of the rulers.
31 Hong Junpei, International Law, pp. 164–212.
distinguish one from another.32 Not surprisingly, a disproportionately large body of
the state administration grew and functioned to deal with external affairs.
Diplomatic reciprocity and diplomatic immunity were norms recognized and
granted. 33
The balance of power was the most vital institution that sustained the existence of
the Ancient Chinese system of states. It is in fact difficult to contest the argument
that it is the collapse of the balance of power that led to the establishment of the
first Chinese empire in 221 BC by the Qin state. Two important Chinese classics,
Chunqiu (The Annals of Spring and Autumn) and Zuozhuan (Zuo’s Tradition)
record chronologically the rise and fall of states and are rich in stories of how states
played the balance of power game for survival, protection, conservation and
expansion. The idea and practice of balance of power can be found in the rich
vocabulary about Ba (leadership/hegemony), Meng (covenant/alliance), and Hui
(convention/conference). The best part of the Warring States period saw the
unravelling of the balance of power among seven contending states. To the strategy
of lianheng (forming vertical alliances) initiated by the other six states to contain the
Qin, the Qin state responded innovatively with a counter strategy of hezong (forming
horizontal alliances), which sought to strike alliance relationships with any one or
more of the other six states. Combined with its strategy of yuanjiao jingong (making
alliance with distant states, while attacking the ones that are nearby), the Qin
emerged victoriously as the unifier of China. Hezong lianheng and yuanjiao jingong
are now two important legacies in Chinese strategic thinking.
In a broad sense, the rules, norms and accepted behaviours and the institutional
practices discussed above, with the exception of balance of power, were conceptual-
ized in Ancient China as li, meaning rituals. They were thought to be morally and
not legally binding codes. Conceptualized as a totality, it was arguably fundamental
to the operation of the Ancient Chinese states-system. Such a different conceptualiz-
ation informs us of a uniquely Chinese view of how human life, including
‘international’ life, should be organized. As an ancient institution, li predated the
emergence of the Chinese states-system. It derived from the Chinese belief in a
hierarchical cosmic order within which every being was assigned a proper place.
Harmonious co-operation and co-existence could only be achieved by close
observation of propriety. Li therefore governed not only the conduct of individuals,
but also that of states. Serious violation or even incompetent observation of li in
interstate relations could have put the moral authority and legitimacy of a ruler into
question, and may even have brought collective condemnation of, or war against, the
perpetrator state. Some twentieth century Chinese scholars argue that rules and
norms embodied in li were comparable to international law.34 In a narrower sense,
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32 Walker noted this with clarity. ‘The free Chinese sources record the various diplomatic activities
under such terms as Chao, a court visit paid by one ruler to another; hui, meetings of officials or
nobles of different states, pin, missions of friendly inquiries sent by the ruler of one state to another;
shi, emissaries sent from one state to another; shou, hunting parties where the representatives of
different states combined business with pleasure’. Walker, Multi-State System of Ancient China, p. 75.
33 See Xu Chuanbao, Xianqin Guojifa zhi Yiji (Traces of International Law in Ancient China)
(Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931), pp. 127–50 and Sun Yurong, International Law, pp. 93–118.
34 Fung Yu-lan explicitly argued, for example, that ‘These peacetime and wartime li, as observed by one
state in its relations to another, were equivalent to what we now call international law’. Fung Yu-lan,
A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 178.
rituals refer to ceremonies and ceremonial behaviour. Even in such a narrow
conceptualization, strict observation was required. A large number of diplomatic
representations were obliged and reciprocated among states simply for the purpose
of observing rituals, for example, of the assumption of the throne and the death of
a ruler.
Intellectual legacies
Ancient China was, however, not just a period of warring states. Like the contem-
poraneous ancient Greece, it was also the age of philosophers when a ‘hundred
schools of thought’ flourished. All major Chinese philosophical traditions trace their
origins to the period.35 Philosophical discourses in this period were to leave two
important intellectual legacies on conception, design and operation of the social
order in the Chinese world. The discourse on human nature exposed conflicting
views between two dominant schools of thought, Confucianism and Legalism.
While Confucians, particularly Mencius, regarded human nature as fundamentally
good or at least perfectible through education, Legalists held that human nature was
inherently evil and aggressive, and if unrestrained, always led to conflict.36 For
Confucians, therefore, benevolent government or rule by virtue (de zhi) offered the
best chance for peace and avoidance of conflict, as it brought out the best in
humans. For Legalists, on the other hand, only stringent measures and harsh control
in the form of an authoritarian and even totalitarian government could prevent
conflict. Whereas the Legalists resorted to a rigid system of laws as governing
institutions, Confucians advocated rule by moral examples. They therefore advanced
contradictory propositions of the causes of war, the purpose and function of
government and institutions and systems that best served to promote harmonious
co-existence of social groups and political communities. They promoted different
visions of the moral and social order both within and beyond the state.
The Confucian discourse also sought to perpetuate an idealization of Ancient
China’s unity under the Zhou Dynasty. A moral conviction that the universe is one
peaceful and harmonious whole prevailed in Ancient China. It long predated
Confucius and his contemporaries. It assumed a natural harmony between heavenly
and earthly forces and projected an image of the entire universe as a world-
embracing community. Such universalist thought was, in Bozeman’s words, ‘restated
and amplified’ by Confucians.37 For Confucians, the preordained order of natural
harmony in such cosmic unity could only be achieved when man’s conduct cor-
related to it by observing strictly five important human relationships: those between
husband and wife, father and son, older and younger brother, friend and friend, and
sovereign and minister. All kinds of political conduct must conform to these norms,
beyond family, within state and in the sphere of humanity at large.
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35 Levenson and Schurmann, China: An Interpretive History, pp. 56–61. See also Fung Yu-lan, A Short
History.
36 A number of short excepts from classical Chinese philosophical writings on opposing views of
human nature can be found in Evan Luard (ed.), Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution
of Ideas about International Society (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 5–17.
37 Bozeman, Politics and Culture, p. 134.
The idealization of the feudal ideal of the political unity of Ancient China attrib-
uted mainly to Confucians was arguably one of the most important philosophical
legacies that had a lasting impact on the Chinese view of the world. It was claimed
that China, or the civilization known to Confucians, had always been ruled by a
single monarch in antiquity. It fostered a longing for the golden age of antiquity
when harmony and peace were said to prevail. For Confucians in the Warring States
period, political unity became a perennial ideal. Mencius is reputed to have advised
a prince that ‘Where there is unity, there is peace’. Such a concept of political unity
associated with harmony and peace has, ever since, exercised a greater hold on the
Chinese imagination than the actual record of belligerency, discord and enforced
unification which are characteristic of many periods of Chinese history.
Confucius and Confucians represented one school of thought in the Warring
States period. They were important, not only because they turned out to be
harbingers of a future age, but also because Confucian ideas, ‘amorphous, adaptable
and various’ as they are,38 were used for the design of imperial institutions and
systems of government and governance, particularly in the Han Dynasty, as the
Confucian-legalist amalgam (the so-called Imperial Confucianism) became the
prevailing ideology in the imperial bureaucracy. The common notion of universal
kingship became inextricably associated with the peculiarly Confucian mystique of
rule by virtue and with ‘absolutization of the Confucian moral order’.39 The raison
d’être for the emerging Pax Sinica after the Han Dynasty was naturally underlined
by the rise of Confucianism during the Han, which ensured that the cosmic and
social universe was reimagined and the universal kingship was reinvented to invest
the Chinese emperor, the Son of Heaven, with mediating moral power between
heaven and earth, for achieving harmony and order in social as well as cosmic space.
Pax Sinica and the tribute system: institutional resilience and rationality 
The transformation of the Ancient Chinese interstate system into a universal empire
was accomplished when six other contending states were vanquished by the Qin one
by one in quick succession in the short period between 230 and 221 BC. The
establishment of the first unified empire in China was however historically contin-
gent, particularly on the military power of the Qin state and the operation of a set
of institutions introduced by Lord Shang. It was also contingent on the dominance
of Legalist thought in the Qin statecraft that worshipped despotic power and rule by
law and force. The Confucian discourse that promoted the myth of China’s political
unity in antiquity may have also helped legitimize the replacement of the anarchic
system of multiple states by a universal empire.40 Over the next two millenniums,
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38 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian
Porter), (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 66.
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Imperial China created and sustained an international system that ‘proved to be
more enduring and successful than the comparable order of any other historical
nation’.41 Pax Sinica, frequently labelled as the Chinese world order, took centuries
to take its definitive shape amidst the vicissitudes of the Chinese empire. It is,
however, the only ‘sub-global international system’, in Buzan and Little’s words, that
survived the ancient and classical period and flourished in the better part of modern
world history. It co-existed with the European society of states until the second half
of the nineteenth century when it was incorporated into the Westphalian order. As
such, it can be counted as one of the greatest institutional innovations and
achievements of traditional China. One of the remarkable feats of Pax Sinica, which
is also an enduring puzzle, is the longevity and flexibility of its fundamental
institution, the tribute system.
The tribute system in theory and practice
The origin of the tribute system (chao gong ti xi) as special trading arrangements can
be traced back at least to the Han Dynasty, the ‘formative years’ of such institutions
in Chinese international relations.42 Early records of China’s tributary relations
included various missions from the ancient Roman and Persian empires.43 However,
the tribute system that evolved throughout centuries was much more than a trading
network, or even an international economic system. Already during the Han
Dynasty, tributes played important political functions in keeping peace with, as well
as in winning, allies against the aggressive Xiongnu, the principal threat to the
Chinese empire.44 Understandably, it was during the Tang Dynasty (618–907), after
imperial unity was re-established, that the tribute system witnessed its most
aggressive and rapid expansion and institutionalization. It extended to see the
participation of many non-Chinese states and polities from Central, South and
Southeast Asia.45 Some Tang records claim that China had as many as seventy-two
tributaries.46
The physical expansion of the tribute system paled into insignificance when
compared with the maturation of the tribute system as the institutional expression
of Pax Sinica. The existence and expansion of the tribute system was underlined by
basic assumptions of the superiority of Chinese civilization. Increasingly during the
Tang Dynasty, they became mutually constitutive. While the tribute system was seen
as embodying the political submission of barbarians, this perceived political sub-
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mission reinforced Imperial China’s sense of superiority. Such tributary relationships
that matured during the Tang thus became the only normative order that did not
contradict the Chinese worldview. The central assumption of such a worldview was
that China was the civilization. The Chinese emperor, as the Son of Heaven, had the
mandate of Heaven to rule Tianxia (all-under-heaven). The natural extension of this
logic had two important implications, at least in theory. One was that the
institutional structure of the Chinese world order had to be hierarchical, with the
Chinese emperor sitting at the apex of this order with a heavenly mandate. The other
was that China, as the superior moral power, was responsible for maintaining and
harmonizing this order with the moral examples it set, with institutional innovations
and with force if necessary. The tribute system became in this light an institutional
arrangement through which the moral authority of the Chinese empire could be
translated into ‘normative pacification’ in Chinese international relations.47
At a more practical level, the tribute system was an institutional complex to
ensure co-existence among the entities of the Chinese empire: barbarian tribes,
kingdoms, peripheral political communities and eventually even the European states.
Over time it became the institutional solution to co-operation problems among
polities interacting with Imperial China in the Chinese world. Three observations
must be made with regard to such interactions. First, participants in the Chinese
international system interacted with Imperial China in decisively different fashions,
contingent upon their geopolitical locations, cultural and historical linkages and
commercial interests. Whereas Inner and Central Asian nomadic and barbarian
tribes participated in the Chinese world order mostly through war and conquest,48
the participation of European empires and states was almost exclusively through
trade until the mid-nineteenth century. Second, whereas the intensity of interactions
between Imperial China and other participants varied individually and temporally,
in general, those participants did not interact with each other in any meaningful
manner. European states certainly did not enter into any meaningful relationship
with any Inner and Central Asian barbarian tribes through their participation in the
Chinese world order. Even Annam and Korea, two core members of the Chinese
tribute system, did not have regular and sustained contact with each other. One
possible exception was between Korea and Japan.49 Third, it follows that the pattern
of interactions in the Chinese international system was radically different from the
two models that Buzan and Little have suggested. It conforms neither to the more
primitive linear pattern nor to the multiordinate pattern that is largely based on the
European experience.50 The interactions within the Chinese international system are
still better captured by a radiational pattern with Imperial China at the centre.
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Acute contradictions have been noted between the normative claims embodied in
the tribute system that perpetuated the myth of Chinese moral and cultural
superiority and the actual behaviour of Chinese rulers in dealing with other
members within the Chinese world order. Chinese assumptions about super- and
subordination between China and all other tributary countries were not necessarily
accepted by others.51 There are many examples, too, where Chinese emperors
explicitly acknowledged the equality of ‘barbarians’ with the Chinese and even
acquiesced in the Chinese inferiority.52 The Heqin (peace and friendship) policy
implemented during the Han Dynasty, when it paid tribute to Xiongnu and even
married one princess to pacify the barbarian Shanyu, are examples.53 The Northern
Song emperors were known to have concluded treaties with the Qidan ruler of the
Liao (916–1125) in 1005 and 1042 respectively, accepting inferior status and agreeing
to pay annual tribute. In 1142, the Southern Song did the same with the Jin
(1115–1234) now replacing the Liao.54 Even the powerful and ambitious Yongle
Emperor (1402–24) of the Ming was believed to have addressed Central Asian
monarchs on equal terms.55 Conventional wisdom finds it difficult to square such
tensions. ‘The chief problem of China’s foreign relations’, Fairbank asserted more
than thirty years ago, ‘was how to square theory with fact, the ideological claim with
actual practice’.56
Does this disjuncture between theory and practice add weight to Krasner’s
argument that ‘organized hypocrisy’57 is ‘the normal state of affairs’? The hypocrisy
embodied in the organizing principles, norms and practices of the Chinese world
order is embedded as an intended institutional feature. It may be indeed argued that
it is precisely such purposive institutional ambiguities in the actual operation of the
tribute system that made it a flexible system for the conduct of Imperial China’s
foreign relations.58 The myth of Chinese superiority had to be maintained, however,
for domestic purposes. As Joseph Fletcher concluded in his study of Sino-Central
Asian tributary relations:
Within the empire, the myth of world suzerainty was a useful ideological instrument for
ruling China, and as Shahrukh’s ambassadors and the khojas found, it was not to be
compromised. But in foreign affairs the myth often proved a hindrance. Then quietly, the
emperor practised what he pleased, not what he preached. Relations on an equal basis with
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Herat, Lhasa, Kokand, or Moscow were not exceptions to Chinese practices at all. They were
customary dealings on the unseen side of a long-established tradition.59
The Chinese, barbarians and the world
The formation, evolution and operation of the tribute system, and by the same
token its ambiguities and resilience, were underlined by a perennial discourse on the
distinction and relationship between the Chinese and barbarians. The discourse was
about cultural unity of the Chinese world as much as about how civilization and
barbarism define each other. ‘China is the centre and is meant to exercise control
over barbarians, whereas barbarians are outsiders who should submit themselves to
China’.60 Such was the moral conviction and cultural assumption in the discourse.
The Chinese assumption of cultural superiority was further reinforced by its contact
with barbarians along its borders. A rigid dichotomy became embedded in Imperial
China’s conceptualization of its relationship with other peoples and political entities.
A relationship of superordination and subordination so conceived as a system of co-
existence between the Chinese and barbarians also complied with the Confucian
assumptions about cosmic harmony.
Yet, Chinese is more a culturally than racially defined concept. As discussed
above, to sinicize the barbarians (yi xia bian yi) was one main thrust of imperial
expansion. Non-Chinese ethnic groups could become Chinese and be brought into
the embrace of the Empire when they had accepted Chinese customs, Confucian
ideology and when they performed proper rituals. As noted by Fairbank, the idea of
laihua (come and be transformed) implied an acculturation process and reflected the
Chinese conviction that barbarians could be transformed, that is, sinicized, by
simple exposure to Confucianism and to the Chinese culture.61 Distinctions were
thus maintained between inner barbarians (more sinicized) and outer barbarians
(less sinicized). All ‘uncivilized barbarians’ could become ‘civilized’ barbarians’.62
There was, therefore, only a thin line between the Chinese and barbarians. Equally,
there was the barbarism of the Chinese to consider, though the Chinese were mostly
silent about it. Such dialectic interpretation of Chinese vis-à-vis barbarians leaves a
large room for manoeuvring but also creates a great ambiguity. As a tenth century
Chinese philosopher, Han Yu, noted, ‘when Confucius composed the Spring and
Autumn [Annals], if the leaders of the land adopted alien modes of behaviour he
treated them as aliens; but once they had advanced into the countries of the centre,
he treated them as he did the inhabitants of the centre.’63 In the twentieth century,
such ambiguity and ambivalence continued to be used to circumvent an acute
problem presented to Chinese political theory by Imperial China’s conquest and
prolonged rule by cultural aliens. In a discourse with Derk Bodde about foreign
domination of the Chinese empire, Fung Yu-lan argued that when the Mongols and
System, empire and state in Chinese international relations 55
59 Fletcher, ‘China and Central Asia’, p. 224.
60 He Fangchuan, A Study of Pax Sinica, p. 37.
61 Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’, pp. 8–9.
62 Lien-sheng Yang, ‘Historical Notes’, p. 21.
63 Michael Loewe, ‘The Heritage Left to the Empires’, in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China, p. 993.
Manchus conquered China, ‘they had already to a considerable extent adopted the
culture of the Chinese. They dominated the Chinese politically, but the Chinese
dominated them culturally. They therefore did not create a marked break or change
in the continuity and unity of Chinese culture and civilization’.64
Towards an institutional rationality
Some fundamental questions remain. Why should the Chinese international order
have been organized differently, for example, from both the ancient Greek city-states
system and the modern international society that developed in northern Europe
from around 1500? What made it so different? Why did rival institutional alter-
natives fail to replace it even when foreign domination of Imperial China prevailed
as during the Yuan Dynasty with Pax Tartarica and the Qing Dynasty with the
Manchu rule? Why did the tribute system persist and even expand when the Chinese
empire was extremely weak (during the Song Dynasty, for example)? In the final
analysis, what accounted for the institutional rationality of the tribute system?
Unravelling these puzzles entails an investigation into what Reus-Smit calls the
‘deep constitutional structure’ of Pax Sinica. Constitutional structures of any
international society, in Reus-Smit’s conceptualization, are complexes of metavalues
that ‘define the social identity of the state, and the broad parameters of legitimate
state action’.65 Three components of these complexes of metavalues are hegemonic
beliefs in the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and
norms of pure procedural justice. Most importantly, constitutional structures are
historically contingent as they are informed by their own historical and cultural
contexts. Reus-Smit further contends that it is the variation in the ideas about the
moral purpose of the state that explains the divergent institutional designs and
practices of historical societies of states.66 If we follow this argument to its logical
conclusion, the endurance of a particular world order can therefore be attributed to
the persistence of a dominant idea about the moral purpose of the state.
How much can this insight help? Adopting Reus-Smit’s analytical template in
explaining institutional variations of historical societies of states takes us a step
further. In Chinese international society, the hegemonic belief in the moral purpose
of the state, and indeed of all political and social communities from family, tribe to
empire, is embodied in Confucianism. It is to promote social and cosmic order and
harmony.67 This provides the ‘justificatory foundations’ for the constitutive principle
of the Chinese world order and informs systemic norms of procedural justice. As the
Confucian conception of the world is civilizational, the organizing principle of
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sovereignty68 is concentrically hierarchical, with China sitting at the core and others
assigned a place according to how ‘civilized’ they are. An elaborate set of rituals (li)
are designed and evolved as an ancient standard of ‘civilization’, which define the
norms of procedural justice and the observance of which decides the places of
others in the hierarchy of the Chinese world order. It also enables others to
participate in this order. Seen in such a light, the tribute system is the fundamental
institution that embodies both philosophical assumptions and institutional practices
within the Chinese world order and that structures relations and ensures co-operation
between China and other participants in Pax Sinica. It is also through the tribute
system that peacetime diplomacy is carried out. For the purpose of comparison, the
following table is illustrative.69
An analysis of institutional rationality provides suggestive answers to the
questions of the distinctiveness as well as the longevity of the Chinese world order.
So long as the hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of the state and more broadly,
of the political community incarnated in Confucianism, prevails, the tribute system
as a basic institutional practices in the Chinese world order is likely to stay. At the
same time, it suggests an alternative and tentative solution to two important puzzles
at which historians have long marvelled. First, the Chinese world order prevails in
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Table 1. Constitutional structures and fundamental institutions of international societies: a
comparison.
Modern society
Societies of states Ancient Greece Imperial China70 of states
Constitutional
structures
1. Moral purpose Cultivation of Promoting cosmic Augmentation of
of state bios politikos and social harmony individuals’
purposes and 
potentialities
2. Organizing Democratic Sovereign Liberal 
principle of sovereignty hierarchy sovereignty
sovereignty (civilizational)
3. Systemic Discursive Ritual justice Legislative
norm of justice justice
procedural
justice
Fundamental Interstate Tribute system Contractual
institutions arbitration international law
multilateralism
times of Imperial China’s military weakness precisely because military strength on
its own is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the maintenance of this
order. Second, as long as non-Chinese ruling elites accept, as the Chinese do, those
assumptions underlining the prevailing belief in the moral purpose of the state, no
alternative institutional designs seem to serve the purpose better. These tentative
answers raise an important question. Is the clash between the European inter-
national society and the Chinese world order in the second half of the nineteenth
century attributable primarily to the conflict between the two different conceptions
of the moral purpose of the state?
China as a state among states: the Imperial collapse and intellectual contest
Even when we could not provide definitive answers to the question raised above, it is
indisputable that the collapse of the Chinese world order in the second half of the
nineteenth century was accompanied by the demise of the Chinese belief in the
moral purpose of the state. More fundamentally, Imperial China, as an empire and a
civilization, was to be transformed into a nation-state within a short span of seventy
years after the first violent arrival of the European international society in East Asia
as seen in the armed conflicts during the Opium War (1839–42). In that time,
Chinese images of the world and of international order were shaken distressingly in
the first instance before being rejected forever. While political economy may explain
the cyclic dynastic rise and fall in Chinese history, it was the encountering of the two
international orders, European and Chinese, that is mostly responsible for the
imperial collapse that brought to an end the history of all dynastic cycles in China.
The third great transformation in Chinese international relations not only brought
China into the emerging global international society, but also made expanding
European international society global.
The arrival of the European international society
The first extensive and substantive intellectual and cultural contact between China
and Europe was initiated by Jesuit missionaries towards the end of the sixteenth
century. As is well known, the Jesuits diffused the European ideas of science in
China, including elements of mathematics, astronomy, geography and medicine, thus
making the Chinese aware of the existence of an admirable, though not necessarily
equal, civilization other than the Chinese. They also introduced the Chinese
civilization to Europe. Matteo Ricci, for example, was believed to be the first to
present a map of the world to the Chinese Emperor in 1601. The Jesuits also helped
draft in Latin Imperial China’s peace treaty with Russia in 1689—the Treaty of
Nerchinsk, thus involving themselves in China’s diplomacy with a European power.71
This process differed from the encounter with European international society two
hundred years later in several important aspects. First and foremost, the agents were
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missionaries of a religious faith, not diplomats or soldiers acting on behalf of a
state. There was neither political power nor economic force behind them. Second, it
followed that cultural exchange and the spread of religious beliefs were sought in
this contact, not political gains nor economic benefits. Third, by the same token, this
contact did not challenge or threaten either the dominant view of the world held by
the Confucians or the existing political and moral order prevailing in Imperial
China.72 It is also worth remembering that this had happened before the onset of the
Westphalian order and the formation of a European society of states in the mid-
seventeenth century. Many ideas associated with modern international society, such
as independent states, equal sovereignty, and exclusive territoriality, were still to be
firmly embedded in the practice of European international relations. Moreover,
confidence in the superiority of the European civilization was yet to be established.
The first arrival of European international society to China predated the Opium
War (1839–42)—the date that is conventionally regarded as the arrival of Western
powers—by almost fifty years. In 1793, the first British diplomatic mission to China
led by Lord Macartney secured an audience with Emperor Qianlong on 14
September. This unprecedented initiative failed, apparently because Macartney had
refused to kowtow to Emperor Qianlong. Behind Macartney’s refusal, however, lay a
fundamental constitutive principle of European international society: sovereign
equality.73 Underlining King George III’s request presented to Qianlong by Lord
Macartney were a number of assumed norms in European diplomatic practices,
such as resident diplomacy and reciprocity.74 Macartney’s refusal and King George
III’s request therefore amounted to an initial European assault on the fundamental
institutions of the Chinese world order. As Macartney observed at the conclusion of
his ill-fated mission, ‘Nothing is more fallacious than to judge of China by any
European standard’.75 Small wonder that the second British embassy led by Lord
Amherst in 1816 was rejected for similar reasons. Where diplomats failed, soldiers
soon took over. The year 1840 then marked the violent arrival of the European
society of states followed by a series of bloody encounters.
The European expansion into China, however, introduced not a set of norms and
principles prevailing in the European society of states but instituted a roll of
different rules and institutions designed in particular to govern relations between
China and Europe and more broadly, the West. These rules, institutions and
practices were embodied in the so-called treaty system. As Watson noted, ‘the rules
and institutions which the Europeans spread out to Persia and China in the
nineteenth century were those which they had evolved with the Ottomans (for
example, capitulations, consulates with jurisdiction over their nationals) rather than
those in use within Europe itself (for example, free movement and residence virtually
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without passports)’.76 The treaty system in China, which was not totally abolished
until 1943, became both the inspiration and the target of Chinese nationalism at the
turn of the century. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as imperial
institutions were crumbling one after another, the accommodation of Imperial
China into the emerging global international society, like many other non-European
countries, was subjected to China fulfilling the standard of (European) ‘civilization’,
which by then had become part of customary international law.77
The imperial collapse
The imperial collapse here refers not to the disintegration of the Qing Dynasty
brought about by fatal imperial decay and violent internal convulsion, particularly
in the second half of the nineteenth century. It refers to two processes that deprived
the Chinese world order of its rationale and institutional foundation. From this
perspective, it is no coincidence that it is exactly during what Hobsbawm identified
as the age of empire (1875–1914) that the Imperial Chinese world order collapsed
under the assaults of the European society of states.78 Analytically, the collapse of
this universal empire underwent two processes. One was China’s loss of tributary
states along the periphery of the Empire. The expansion of Europe in the form of
British, French and Russian imperialism, and later the Japanese imperial expansion,
reached the peripheral areas of the Middle Kingdom from the 1870s onwards. Of all
the tributary states listed in the 1818 edition of the Collected Statutes of the Qing
Dynasty,79 Liuqiu was annexed by Japan in the 1870s; Britain took Burma after the
third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885 and made it a province of British India in 1886;
France colonized Annam twenty-five years after its first invasion in 1858; Laos
became first a province of Siam and, in 1893, a French protectorate; and Korea was
lost to Japan in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War.80 This painful process totally
destroyed any raison d’etre for the tribute system.
It was nevertheless the second process, that is, the crumbling of the entire pack of
imperial institutions and the final collapse of the imperial polity per se, that rendered
the Imperial collapse irrevocable. It was more than symbolically important that in
1861, Emperor Xianfeng grudgingly conceded that Imperial China had to deal with
Europe on the basis of sovereign equality81 and that in 1873, kowtow was officially
abolished in Sino-foreign relations. Acknowledging sovereignty and equality as the
most fundamental principle in China’s international relations amounted to admitting
the irrelevance of basic assumptions of the Sino-centric view of the world. The
establishment of the Zongli Yamen in 1861 as Imperial China’s first prototype Foreign
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Office was the first important institutional change of China’s conduct of international
affairs. It was followed by China’s hesitant adoption of a host of basic European
institutions and practices in international relations from resident diplomacy to
international law.82 In the end, however, nothing short of a total transformation of the
imperial polity would do. The Imperial Qing government’s attempts at constitutional
monarchy after the Boxers fiasco were no other than an acquiescence in the total
collapse of the universal kingship. The abolition of the Imperial examination system
in 1905 removed, once and for all, Confucianism as the moral and intellectual
foundation for the imperial order.83 In this sense, the reform in the final decade of the
Qing Dynasty constituted an integral part of the Imperial retreat. The Republican
revolution became but a logical conclusion of such a collapse.
These dual processes of Imperial collapse marked the agonizing transition of
China from a universal empire to a ‘civilized’ state. They were also processes through
which Imperial China was gradually and forcibly accommodated into the emerging
global international society. At the root of the fierce contest between Imperial China
and the European society of states was mutual rejection of each other’s institutional
arrangements and underlying assumptions about how a world order should be
organized. In this violent contest, the metavalue complex that informed the
constitutional structure of the Chinese world order disintegrated. Imperial China
was thus confronted by a dual challenge at the turn of the twentieth century. One
was how to build down the empire into a state. And the other was how to build up
China (from its largely local and provincial basis) into a nation and a state as
conceptualized by the invading Europeans so as to prevent China from becoming ‘a
mere geographic expression’ (Metternich).84
Intellectual contest
The arrival of the European international society, with its ideas about the ‘inter-
national’ and what world politics was all about, induced a greater intellectual
challenge than the eventual collapse of the Chinese world order. For those professed
Confucian cosmopolitans who were living in the nineteenth century, their one-time
‘universal empire’ suddenly became provincial. The cherished principles, ideas,
norms and institutions that had hitherto organized their world were promptly
rendered irrelevant. When Tianxia (all-under-heaven) shrank to guojia (state), the
Chinese world became a China in the world. Confucian cosmopolitans, erstwhile
institutional innovators and designers, had to accept alien institutions as indispens-
ably instrumental in China’s handling of its relationship with the wider world.
Confucian China, however, did not concede without putting up an obstinate
intellectual contest. Such a contest constituted an integral process through which the
Chinese came to terms with radical changes in their world.
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For orthodox Confucianists, the problems of the day and particularities of
China’s social and political situation in the second half of the nineteenth century
could only be understood in terms of the past. The European expansion was
therefore identified with traditional ‘barbarian’ invasions in earlier times. The new
world that China experienced was in this sense comparable to the Warring States
period in Chinese history. It was only natural that ‘China’s response to the West’ was
initially sought through the reinterpretation of the Chinese heritage and timeless
wisdom, rather than through denial and rejection. The grudging and limited
endorsement of European institutions mentioned above in dealing with China’s
foreign relations during the Tongzhi Restoration period (1862–74) did not reflect
deep normative changes so much as the application of ‘practical statesmanship’
within the limits of Confucian assumptions about eternal normative values and
immutable principles of statecraft.85
Such an intellectual contest shifted ground radically when China’s plight was
turned into an acute crisis by Imperial China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of
1894–95. The question now was not whether European institutions were alien or
even possibly adaptable to the Chinese tradition, but whether eternal Confucian
values and institutions had become obstacles to the preservation of China as a state
in the face of relentless Western intrusion. Almost overnight, Confucianism lost its
initiative and force. Confucianism, in order to be retained, had now to be
reinterpreted in terms of the Western tradition.86 Crudely but subtly, the crisis
turned two previously compatible goals into an antithetical choice: the survival of
China as a state vis-à-vis the preservation of Confucian values and institutions.
Loyalty to China as a state and a nation took priority over the commitment to
traditional Confucian ethics and values: this led to the alienation of Chinese elites
from authentic Chinese traditions and contributed to the awakening of Chinese
nationalism. From Yan Fu’s attempts to transvaluate traditional values by introduc-
ing Herbert Spencer and social Darwinism87 to Liang Qichao’s cry for the birth of a
‘new people’ as an earlier effort to construct an ‘imagined community’ of the
Chinese nation, one can see that the contest between China and the West created
what Bozeman calls ‘a state of sociological neurosis’ in Chinese society.88 Political
nationalism and cultural iconoclasm associated symbolically with the May Fourth
movement was no more than a radical continuation of such an intellectual contest.
The introduction of Marxism and the establishment of the Chinese Communist
Party in 1921 should be seen as a revolt against the West, not only in terms of
confronting its political and military dominance but also in terms of challenging its
intellectual and cultural domination.
62 Yongjin Zhang
85 Teng, Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank (eds.), China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey,
1839–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).
86 Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1972), vol. 1, p. ix. Levenson made a revealing comparison between two encounters
of Confucianism and Western thought. In his words, ‘In the first case, the Chinese tradition was
standing firm, and Western intruders sought admission by cloaking themselves in the trappings of
that tradition; in the second case, the Chinese tradition was disintegrating, and its heirs, to save the
fragments, had to interpret them in the spirit of the Western intrusion’.
87 See Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power.
88 Bozeman, Politics and Culture, p. 8.
Conclusion 
In the twentieth century, war, revolution and reform are social processes that have
ravaged as well as rescued China, as its social and political order has been reshaped
and reconstructed time and again. In the same period, China’s socialization within
the Westphalian order has been anything but easy. Symbolically, the century opened
with the Boxer Rebellion and the subsequent Allied military intervention. It closed
with China being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and becoming a
member of the World Trade Organization. Yet, even at the dawn of the new
millennium, China’s full membership in the global international society continues to
be contested, as many question China’s sincerity and willingness to accept the
responsibilities that are associated with Great Power status. As a rising power,
China, for its own part, has fiercely contested the normative changes in post-Cold
War international society that have seen human rights and democratization become
part of the daily round of political practice. As the world seems to be moving
beyond Westphalia, China stands as a staunch defender of the Westphalian order.
Why then does the accommodation of China into the evolving global inter-
national society prove to be such an difficult task? What answers are suggested by
this investigation into the longue durée of Chinese history? Lucian Pye recently
remarked that ‘[T]he starting point for understanding the problem is to recognize
that China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a
civilization pretending to be a state’.89 This proposition suggests an alternative way
to appreciate the difficulties in understanding contemporary China in global
international society. From the long historical perspective provided in this essay,
China is still in the throes of the third great transformation of its international
relations. Further, for the Chinese, this transformation differs from the previous two
in that conflicts and contestations now are inter-civilizational, rather than intra-
civilizational. The ‘clash’ of civilizations which Samuel Huntington famously
celebrated, is not just a scenario for the future of international relations but should
also be seen as an intimate part of its history.
The institutional analysis of the first two historically varying forms of inter-
national order in Chinese history poses important questions about the relationship
between the past and the present. It illuminates the diversity and richness of
international life in world history, in terms of institutional arrangements, traditional
conceptualizations of order, and political thought and behaviour. Such diversity and
richness is unfortunately what is sorely missing in IR theorizing. No credible IR
theory, however, can be built only upon the narrow confines of the European
historical experience. The empirical universe that IR theory needs to address must
expand decisively into the non-European world and beyond Westphalia. China’s rich
and deep history is an important avenue for exploring other world orders. In the
analysis above, I have provided a starting point for thinking about how China
conceptualized relations among political communities, designed appropriate
institutions to resolve problems of conflict and co-existence, and operated
successfully in an international system of its own making over millenniums.
System, empire and state in Chinese international relations 63
89 Lucian Pye, ‘China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society’, p. 58.
